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McLean: Torts - Duties of Owners and Occupiers of Land: The Impact of the

TORTS-Duties of Owners and Occupiers of Land: The impact of
the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision to abolish a portion of
the common law status classifications. Clarke v. Beckwith, 858
P.2d 293 (Wyo. 1993).

Rex Beckwith invited Debra S. Clarke to attend his annual Christmas
party which he hosted at his Sinks Canyon home on Monday, December 23,
1991.1 Snow fell on Beckwith's property during the weekend preceding the
party, and Beckwith attempted to clear this snow from his driveway prior to
his party.

2

Clarke arrived at Beckwith's home after dark and had to park near the
top of his 400-foot long driveway which descended from the highway to
Beckwith's house. 3 Although it was dark, Clarke later stated that the driveway

appeared icy and "only the sidewalk in front of his house" appeared free of
snow or ice.4
Clarke slipped twice before actually falling, and approximately fifteen
minutes passed before help arrived.' Many people came to Clarke's aid as
soon they heard her cries for help, and she was immediately taken to a hospital. 6 The fall broke Clarke's leg in seven places. 7 Treatment included surgical intervention; future surgery may be necessary
After her fall and resulting injury, Clarke filed a complaint against
Beckwith in the district court, Ninth Judicial District, Fremont County, Wyoming.9 The district court classified Clarke as a social guest l° or licensee." As
such, the only duty Beckwith owed Clarke was to refrain from harming her

1. Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293, 295 (Wyo. 1993).
2. Id.

3. Brief of Appellant at 2-3, Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 (Wyo. 1993) (No. 92-288)
[hereinafter Brief of Appellant].
4. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 295.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Brief of Appellee at 5, Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 (Wyo. 1993) (No. 92-288)
[hereinafter Brief of Appellee].
10. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 295. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 37-57 and accompanying text.
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willfully or wantonly. 2 The district court found that no genuine issue of fact
existed relating to willful or wanton conduct by Beckwith, so it granted
Beckwith's motion for summary judgment. 3
Clarke appealed the district court's decision to the Wyoming Supreme
Court, 4 raising the question of what duty an owner or occupier owes to those
who enter upon his land. 5 The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district
court's decision and remanded the case to the district court. In its decision,
the court overruled established precedent and abolished the common law
distinction between invitees and licensees in Wyoming. 6 While trespassers
remain a distinct category, a landowner or occupier must exercise reasonable
care under the circumstances with regard to all others who enter upon his
7
land. 1

This casenote examines the history and evolution of the liability of
landowners and occupiers, and the three main approaches currently employed

in the United States. It then evaluates the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision
to abandon its prior approach to determining the duties of landowners and

12. The Wyoming Supreme Court has defined "willful and wanton" misconduct to mean "that
the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to
him or so obvious to him that he must have been aware of it and so great as to make it obvious that
harm would follow." Yalowizer v. Husky Oil Company, 629 P.2d 465, 470 n.6 (Wyo. 1981). See
also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 213 (5th ed.

1984).
13. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 295.
14. Id. at 294.
15. Id. Appellant Clarke stated the issues as:
Did the trial court err when it granted Appellee's (Defendant below) Motion for Summary
Judgment? Were there genuine issues of material fact which precluded the entry of summary judgment? Was Appellee entitled to judgment as a matter of law?
and also posed the following sub-issues:
What duty of care is owed by the owner and occupant of premises who expressly invites
persons to his or her premises? Was there a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Appellee breached that duty in this case, and was Appellee entitled to judgment as a matter
of law?
Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at,l. In response, Appellee Beckwith phrased the issues as:
1. Was Summary Judgment appropriately rendered in favor of Appellee Beckwith because
a. there were no genuine issues of material fact as to the legal status of Appellant
Clarke at the time she fell on Appellee's driveway, and
b. there were no genuine issues of material fact supporting the contention that
Appellee's conduct fell below the willful and wanton standard of care?
2. Should this Court abandon the common law classifications of trespasser, licensee, and
invitee in favor of an ordinary negligence standard of care for entrants upon the land of
others?
Brief of Appellee, supra note 9, at 5.
16. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 294.
17. Id. at 296.
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occupiers for a more modem development, and the effect this decision will
have on Wyoming landowners and occupiers.
BACKGROUND

There are three main approaches to determining the duties of landowners and occupiers in the United States today. The majority of jurisdictions still
employ the common law status classification scheme where the landowner or
possessor's"8 duty is determined by the entrant's status. A second group of
jurisdictions have completely abandoned the common law scheme and require
the possessor to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The final
group of jurisdictions has abrogated the distinction between licensees and
invitees, but continues to view trespassers as a distinct category.
Common Law Status Classifications
Many jurisdictions 9 still adhere to the common law classification
scheme where the duty a possessor owes one who enters upon his land varies
with the status of the entrant.20 Entrants upon another's land are divided into
three distinct categories: trespassers, licensees, and invitees, with different
levels of care owed to each.2 ' This categorical classification system creates a
"sliding scale" whereby the duty owed or protection afforded increases as the
entrant's presence becomes more legitimate. 2

18. The terms owner, landowner, occupier, and possessor are often used interchangeably in
premises liability law. JOSEPH A. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY § 1.3, at 2 (2d ed. 1988).

The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS uses the term possessor:

A possessor of land is
(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it or
(b) a person who has been in occupation of land with intent to control it, if no
other person has subsequently occupied it with intent to control it, or
(c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if no other person
is in possession under Clauses (a) and (b).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 E (1981).
19. See, e.g., Van Dinter v. City of Kennewick, 846 P.2d 522 (Wash. 1993); Baldwin by
Baldwin v. Mosley, 748 S.W.2d 146 (Ark. 1988); Murphy v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 428
A.2d 459 (Md. 1981). See also Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Conditioning

Landowner'sLiability upon Status of Injured Party as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser, 22 A.L.R. 4th
294 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
20. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 58, at 393.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Trespassers

A trespasser enters or remains on the land of another without consent.23
The general rule is that the possessor is not liable for harm suffered by a
trespasser resulting from the possessor's failure to exercise reasonable care in
the maintenance of his land.2' In jurisdictions which adhere to the common
law classification scheme, the possessor's only duty is to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring the trespasser.' A possessor's duties are limited due
to societal notions of private ownership of land and protection of private
property rights.2 6 A person should be able to make use of his land without
worrying about those present on the land without permission.2
Dissatisfaction with the potential harshness of this general rule led to the
development of several exceptions.28 These exceptions are due in part to a
more modem belief that the values of human life and protection of human
safety outweigh the possessor's private property interests. 9 This is especially
true where the burden of taking precautions is small compared to the risk
faced by trespassers.3

A possessor may owe a greater duty of care to frequent, known, or
discovered trespassers. Child trespassers are also usually entitled to a greater
duty of care. 3
A possessor generally has a duty to warn known or constant trespassers
of highly dangerous or hidden artificial conditions.32 The possessor is also

23. § 329. Trespasser Defined
A trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of another
without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1981).

24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 333 (1981).
25. Van Dinter, 846 P.2d at 524. See also PAGE, supra note 18, § 2.3, at 9.

26. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 58, at 395.
27. Id.
28. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 334-339 (1981).
29. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 58, at 395.
30. Id.
31. See Thunder Hawk by and through Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 844 P.2d 1045
(Wyo. 1992) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1981) for a complete discussion of the
rules and duties regarding child trespassers, and the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 335 and 337 (1981). Note that the Restatement im-

poses no duty to warn of highly dangerous natural conditions.

Wyoming does not seem to have

followed the Restatement's requirement that a landowner warn known or frequent trespassers of highly dangerous artificial conditions. The cases repeatedly state that a possessor's only duty to a trespasser is to refrain from willful or wanton injury. See, e.g., Yalowizer v. Husky Oil Co., 629 P.2d 465,
469 (Wyo. 1981); Maher v. City of Casper, 219 P.2d 125, 128 (Wyo. 1950).
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usually required to exercise reasonable care when carrying on activities which
pose a threat to known or constant trespassers."
Another important exception to a possessor's lack of duty is that once
the trespasser is discovered, the possessor must exercise reasonable care to
ensure the trespasser's safety.' While a trespasser may be viewed as a wrongdoer, he is not an outlaw."5 Once the trespasser's presence is either known to
or reasonably ascertainable by the possessor, the possessor must take reasonable steps to prevent injury to the trespasser and may have to warn the trespasser of hidden dangers. 36

Licensees
A licensee is a person who enters or remains on another's land by virtue
of the possessor's consent.37 This consent is all that distinguishes a licensee
from a trespasser.38 The purpose of the entrant's visit determines his status,
and a licensee enters for his own purpose, not that of the possessor.39
A visitor whose presence the possessor expressly invites, but who enters
for his own purpose and confers no economic benefit on the possessor is
classified as a licensee. 0 Thus most jurisdictions which adhere to the common
law status classification scheme categorize an expressly invited social guest as
a licensee. 4 This somewhat paradoxical result rests on the idea that a social

guest enters the premises on the same level as a member of the possessor's
family and should accept the premises as used by the possessor and his family.42 A social guest has no right to expect the possessor to take greater precautions for his guest's safety than he would for his own family.43 A social guest

33.
34.
35.
36.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 334 and 336 (1981).
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 58, at 396-97.
Id.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 334-339 (1981).

37. § 330. Licensee Defined
A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue of the
possessor's consent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 (1981).
38. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 60, at 412. The licensee who enters with permis-

sion but without invitation is often referred to as a "bare" or "naked" licensee because the possessor's
consent alone distinguishes the licensee from the trespasser. Id.
39. PAGE, supra note 18, §§ 3.1 and 3.2, at 34-35.
40.
41.
385 (Kan.
§ 3.21, at
42.

Id. §3.3, at 35.
See, e.g., Evans v. Parker, 323 S.E.2d 276 (Ga. App. 1984): Zuther v. Schild, 581 P.2d
1978); McMullan v. Butler, 346 So.2d 950 (Ala. 1977). See also PAGE, supra note 18,
61; 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL.. THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.11, at 215 (2d ed. 1986).
Evans, 323 S.E.2d at 277. See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 60, at 414.

43. Evans, 323 S.E.2d at 277.
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confers no economic benefit on the possessor.' The psychological or emotional benefit the visit confers is insufficient to convert the social guest to an
invitee.4
Early cases in jurisdictions utilizing the common law status classifications held that a possessor had no greater duty than to refrain from intentionally, willfully, or wantonly injuring the licensee. 6 The licensee was viewed as
assuming the risks of any dangers present on the land. 47 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts modified this rule by requiring the possessor to conduct his
activities with reasonable care48 and to exercise reasonable care to warn the
licensee of dangerous conditions on the land.49
While a possessor may lack actual knowledge of a hazard, a duty to
warn the licensee will arise if the possessor has reason to know of the hazard
or it is reasonably discoverable.su Likewise, a possessor need not have actual
knowledge of the licensee's presence to incur a duty to warn. 1 The licensee,
by definition, has the possessor's consent to enter the land, therefore the
possessor should foresee that the licensee will make use of his license.52 The

44. Zuther, 581 P.2d at 386-87.
45. Id. at 387.
46. See. e.g., Blackburn v. Colvin, 380 P.2d 432, 436 (Kan. 1963). See also PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra note 12, § 60, at 415. Although a licensee enters another's land with permission, he
was entitled to no greater duty than a trespasser. Licensees have been described as the "least favored
by law of persons who are not actual wrongdoers." Yalowizer, 629 P.2d at 469.
47. PAGE, supra note 18, § 3.8, at 42.
48. § 341. Activities Dangerous to Licensees
A possessor of land is subject to liability to his licensees for physical harm caused to them
by his failure to carry on his activities with reasonable care for their safety if, but only if,
(a) he should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, and
(b) they do not know or have reason to know of the possessor's activities and of the
risk involved.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 341 (1981).

49. § 342. Dangerous Conditions Known to Possessor
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition on the land if, but only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize
that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect
that they will not discover or realize the danger, and
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the
licensees of the condition and the risk involved, and
(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk
involved.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 (1981).
50. Id.
51. PAGE, supra note 18, § 3.11, at48.
52. Id.
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reasonableness of the licensee's actions will of course affect the level of care a
possessor must exercise.5 3
A possessor has no duty to warn a licensee about risks of which the
licensee knows or should know. 4 Thus no duty arises to warn of risks which
are open or obvious.
A possessor may owe a child licensee a greater degree of care because a
child may fail to appreciate a risk or warning which is obvious to an adult.55
Likewise, the "attractive nuisance" doctrine56 applies to child licensees as well
as child trespassers. 7
Invitees
To be classified as an invitee, the Restatement (First) of Torts required
that the entrant provide an economic benefit, or at least a potential economic
benefit, to the possessor. 8 The entrant's visit must in some way be related to
a business transaction with the possessor.59 The business aspect of the visit
required the possessor to exercise reasonable care as consideration for (potential) economic gain.'
While the economic benefit test sufficiently resolved most cases, courts
sometimes stretched the theory of economic gain to its limits to classify a
visitor as an invitee.61 Thus a child or friend who accompanied a customer
into a store, though he had no intention of buying anything, was classified as
an invitee. The possessor had a duty to treat the entrant as an invitee and

53. Id. at 49. Consider, for example, a licensee with permission to conduct an excavation on
another's land. The possessor could reasonably foresee that such a licensee might enter the land early
in the morning and work throughout the day. The possessor probably would not expect this licensee
to enter the land at 1:00 a.m. to begin work.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342(c) (1981).

55. PAGE, supra note 18, § 3.19, at 58.
56. See supra note 31.
57.
58.

PAGE, supra note 18, § 3.18, at 57-58.
§ 332. Business Visitor Defined

A business visitor is a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on land in the
possession of another for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings
between them.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 332 (1934). See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 61,

at 420.
59. PAGE, supra note 18, § 4.2, at 66.

60. Id.
61.

PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 61, at 420-21. See also Sinclair Refining Co. v.

Redding, 439 P.2d 20 (Wyo. 1968). The Wyoming Supreme Court classified an automobile passenger
using a service station restroom as an invitee. The passenger's only reason for being on the premises
was to use the restroom, free of charge. Id. at 23.
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exercise reasonable care even though he expected no economic benefit, potential or otherwise. 62

William L. Prosser, the reporter to the Second Restatement of Torts,
recognized the need to alter the invitee test:
[T]he duty of the occupier toward his 'invitee' was not, in its inception, a matter of quid pro quo for a benefit conferred or hoped for. It
rested rather upon an implied representation of safety, a holding out
as suitable for the purpose for which the visitor
of the premises
63
came ....

A visitor becomes an invitee when the possessor's actions lead the visitor to assume that the possessor intended that the premises be used by visitors.' The two key elements for determining invitee status are invitation and
purpose.65 An invitation may be express or may be implied if a reasonable
person would be justified in believing that an invitation to enter the premises
exists.66
To be classified as an invitee, the visitor must enter as a member of the
public for the purpose for which the land is held open to the public67 or for a
purpose which is directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with
the possessor.6" If a visitor enters for the latter purpose, the potential economic benefit to the possessor again becomes crucial.'

Since the land is not held

open to the public, the invitation is a private one. A private invitation alone
carries no guarantees, 70 so a potential economic benefit to the possessor is
necessary to classify the visitor as an invitee. 7"

62. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cooper, 104 S.E.2d 90 (Ga. 1958). See also 5 HARPER, JAMES, &
GRAY, supra note 41, § 27,12, at 224-29; PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 61, at 420-21.
63. William L. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573, 585 (1942).
64. § 332. Invitee Defined

(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of
the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose
directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1981).
65. PAGE, supra note 18, § 4.3, at 68.

66. Id. at 69-70. For example a person would reasonably believe that the owner of a retail
store desires the person to enter and browse as well as buy. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 332 cmt. c (1981).

67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332(2) (1981).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332(3) (1981).
69. PAGE, supra note 18, § 4.3, at 73.

70. For a discussion of social guests, see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
71.

PAGE, supra note 18, § 4.3, at 73.
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In jurisdictions which adhere to the common law classification scheme, a
possessor owes the invitee a duty of reasonable care.72 The possessor must
exercise reasonable care in carrying out his activities on the land.73 He must
also warn the invitee of any hidden dangers of which he knows or which are
reasonably discoverable by him, or exercise reasonable care to remove the
dangerous condition.74 The possessor has no duty to warn the invitee of risks
of which the invitee is aware or which are open and obvious.75
In some jurisdictions, including Wyoming, the possessor has no duty to
remove ice or snow which accumulates on his property due to natural forces." The risks posed by ice and snow are also considered to be so well
known and obvious that the possessor is not required to warn entrants of the

conditions.'

Abolition of the Categories:A Negligence Standard
The common law status classifications have been criticized as too harsh,
rigid, and inhumane.78 Allowing an entrant's status to dictate the possessor's

duty seemed to place the protection of property interests above concerns for

72. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 61, at 425.
73. § 341 A. Activities Dangerous to Invitees
A possessor of land is subject to liability to his invitees for physical harm caused to them
by his failure to carry on his activities with reasonable care for their safety if, but only if,
he should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect
themselves against it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 341 A (1981).

74. § 343. Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a
condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect
themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1981).
75. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 61, at 427.
76. See, e.g., Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1982). See also PAGE, supra
note 18, § 4.6, at 84. Local ordinances may impose additional obligations on a possessor of land. In
the absence of such an ordinance, however, a Wyoming landowner has no duty to remove natural
accumulations of snow and ice. See Johnson v. Hawkins, 622 P.2d 941, 943 (Wyo. 1981). The Wyoming Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments to consider whether to abolish the rule that, in the
absence of an ordinance, the possessor has no duty to remove a natural accumulation of snow and ice.
Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc., No. 92-43. No decision has come down as of November 15, 1993. If the
court does not abandon this rule, Mrs. Clarke probably will be unable to recover for her injuries,
because cases involving the natural accumulation of snow and ice suspend a landowner's duty to
exercise reasonable care. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 300 (Golden, J., specially concurring).
77.
78.

Bluejacket v. Camey, 550 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo. 1976).
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 62, at 432-33.
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human welfare. 79 The numerous exceptions to the common law scheme lent
support to claims that it was arbitrary and capricious. Finally, in Rowland v.
Christians° the California Supreme Court abandoned the common law classification scheme.
The Rowland court, relying in part on § 1714 of the California Civil
Code,8' abandoned the common law distinctions deeming them confusing,
unfair, and unworkable."2 The California Supreme Court stated that:
A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection.
because he has come upon the land of another without permission or
with permission but without a business purpose. Reasonable people
do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending upon such matters,
and ...

focus upon status of the injured party ...

to determine the

question whether the landowner has a duty of care, is contrary to our
modern ... values. The common law rules obscure rather than

illuminate the proper considerations which should govern determination of the question of duty.83
The court adopted a negligence standard to determine a possessor's liability.
The possessor has a duty to act reasonably under the circumstances, and while
the entrant's status is a factor to be considered when determining liability, it is
not dispositive of the possessor's duty of care.'
The Rowland decision persuaded several states to abolish the common
law status classifications and apply a negligence standard to possessors of
land.85 In these jurisdictions a possessor must exercise reasonable care under
the circumstances to ensure the safety of those who enter his land. The traditional "tort test of foreseeability" determines the possessor's liability.86

79. Id.
80. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
81. Id. at 563-64. "Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but

also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of
his property or person . . . .

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (WEsT 1990).

The California Supreme Court attributed its decision in part to § 1714 of the California Civil
Code, yet this particular section had been in effect since 1872. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 562. Some authors state that the court may have grown dissatisfied with the common law scheme and wanted to
abolish it. PAGE, supra note 18, § 6.4, at 132.
82. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 566-67.

83. Id. at 568.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Webb v. City and Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731, 733 n.7 (Alaska 1977);
Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 333 A.2d 127, 131 (R.I. 1975). For a more complete list of the
jurisdictions which have abolished the common law status classifications see Gulbis, supra note 19,
22 A.L.R. 4th 294 § 3[a].
86. Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976).
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Compromise: PartialAbrogation of the Categories
Several states have abolished the distinction between licensees and invitees,
yet have retained trespassers as a distinct category.' These states recognize
the problems inherent in the common law status classifications and dislike the
notion of placing a higher value on a possessor's unrestricted freedom than on
human safety." However the trespasser remains in a distinct category because
he is viewed in some sense as a wrongdoer. There is a "significant difference" between one who enters another's property lawfully and one who does
so without permission or right. 9 A possessor need only refrain from Willfully
or wantonly injuring the trespasser, unless the trespasser's presence is known
to the possessor. 90
Ordinary negligence principles determine the possessor's liability to
those previously classified as either licensees or invitees.9 t The possessor must
act reasonably in light of all the circumstances. 92
Duties of Wyoming Landowners Priorto Clarke
Prior to its decision in Clarke, the Wyoming Supreme Court relied on
the traditional common law status classifications to determine the duty of care
a possessor owed an entrant.93 In 1981, the court explicitly refused to abandon
the common law status classifications.94 The Yalowizer court felt that the trend
of abolishing the common law status classifications in favor of a uniform
standard of care was, in fact, a minority position, and that the common law
scheme enjoyed a "healthy following" in the United States. 9

In 1989, the court stated that "the key to creation of a duty to invitees
on the premises is foreseeability." 96 This seemed to hold out some hope to
those who thought that the common law classifications should be abolished.

87. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Teeter, 687 S.W.2d 286 (Tenn. 1985); Flom v. Flom, 291
N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn. 1980); Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 (Me. 1979); O'Leary
v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 751 (N.D. 1977). See also Gulbis, supra note 19, 22 A.L.R. 4th 294

§ 3[b].
88. O'Leary, 251 N.W.2d at 752.

89, Id. at 751 n.6.
90, Id. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
91. O'Leary, 251 N.W.2d at 751.
92. Id.
93. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 297 (Golden, J., specially concurring.) See also Maher v. City of
Casper, 219 P.2d 125 (Wyo. 1950).
94. Yalowizer v. Husky Oil Co., 629 P.2d 465 (Wyo. 1981). "We conclude that the commonlaw principles . . . are still acceptable.- Id. at 469.

95. Id. at 468.
96. Allen v. Slim Pickens Enterprises, 777 P.2d 79, 82 (Wyo. 1989).
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However, the court's focus on the foreseeability aspect of duty was relevant

only to invitees, and as recently as 1992, the court recognized that the common law status classifications were still the rule in Wyoming. 97
PRINCIPAL CASE

The majority opinion in Clarke departed from established Wyoming
precedent by abrogating the distinction between invitees and licensees. 98 Justice Cardine filed a short concurrence, 99 and Justice Golden concurred spe-

cially, writing a separate opinion which Justice Cardine joined. ct
The majority acknowledged that it had taken a step it declined to take
twelve years earlier in Yalowizer v. Husky Oil Company.'' Chief Justice
Macy characterized previous discussions of the invitee-licensee distinction as
primarily dicta. 2 He stated that those previous cases involved injuries to
trespassers, not invitees or licensees.' 03 According to the majority, this area of
the law had undergone "considerable development" subsequent to its decision
in Yalowizer to retain the common law classification scheme, and its decision

four years previously in Allen v. Slim Pickens Enterprises'°4 foreshadowed its
holding in Clarke.'05
As previously discussed, the court recognized that the law in various
jurisdictions can be grouped into one of three categories. 106 Some jurisdictions

97. Thunder Hawk by and through Jensen v. Union Pacific R. Co., 844 P.2d 1045 (Wyo.
1992). The court recognized that the injured child plaintiff was either a trespasser or bare licensee and
adopted the attractive nuisance doctrine as stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 as an
exception to the common law status classifications in cases involving trespassing children. Id. at
1049.
98. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 294.
99. Justice Cardine wrote separately to emphasize his understanding that the court's decision in
Clarke in no way altered or affected Wyoming's "natural accumulation of snow and ice" rule. See
supra note 76. He also stated that the fact that either or both parties carried insurance could not be
considered when determining liability. Id. at 296 (Cardine, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 296 (Golden, J., specially concurring).
101. 629 P.2d 465 (Wyo. 1981). In Yalowizer the court expressly refused to abandon the common law status classifications and reaffirmed that the common law scheme controlled in Wyoming.
Id. at 468-69.
102. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 295.
103. Id, Maher v. City of Casper, 219 P.2d 125 (Wyo. 1950), involved two boys who drowned
in an abandoned quarry; the injured party in Yalowizer took a short cut across an abandoned service
station driveway. Yalowizer, 629 P.2d at 466.
104. 777 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1989).
105. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 295-96. The majority focused on a single sentence from Allen in
which the court stated that "[t]he key to the creation of a duty to the invitees on the premises is foreseeability." 777 P.2d at 82. See infra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
106. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 296.
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still utilize the common law status classifications;"'° some have abolished the
classifications altogether and apply a negligence standard regardless of the
entrant's status;'08 and the final cluster treats trespassers as a distinct category
but applies a negligence standard to all other entrants. 10
The Wyoming Supreme Court chose to move from the first group to
the last. The majority quoted and adopted the rule stated by the North
Dakota Supreme Court in O'Leary v. Coenen."0 The Wyoming Supreme
Court stated that trespassers will remain a distinct group, and the standards for determining landowner liability with regard to trespassers remain unchanged."' However, the distinction between invitees and licensees no longer applies. A landowner or occupier must exercise reasonable
care under the circumstances to maintain his property in a reasonably safe
manner." 2 Factors to be weighed include the likelihood of injury to another, the potential seriousness of such an injury, and the burden of avoiding
or eliminating the risk. The foreseeability of the injury, not the status of
the entrant, is the key to determining the liability of a landowner or occupier. "'
While Justice Golden agreed with and concurred in the result of the
case, he felt that the majority's decision went further than necessary to
decide the issue presented." 4 Justice Golden agreed that landowners owe a
duty of reasonable care to social guests on their premises, but he declined
to join the "wholesale abolition" of the common law categories of invitee
and licensee." 5 According to Justice Golden, this case presented only the
narrow question of the duty owed an expressly invited social guest. Justice Golden stated that a landowner owes such a guest a duty of reasonable care." 6

107.

See supra notes 19-75 and accompanying text.

108. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
110. 251 N.W.2d 746, 751 (N.D. 1977). The North Dakota Supreme Court stated:

In the instant case, rather than continue to predicate liability on the status of an entrant, we
have decided to apply the ordinary principles of negligence to govern a landowner's conduct as to a licensee and an invitee. We do not change our mle as to trespassers. An occupier of premises must act as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably
safe condition inview of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to another, theseriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk.
Id.
Ill. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 296.
O'Leary, 251 N.W.2d at 751).
112. Id. (citing
113. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 296.
114. Id. at 297 (Golden, J., specially concurring).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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Justice Golden also disputed the majority's claim that "considerable
development" in the area of premises liability law since Yalowizer supported elimination of the common law distinction between invitee and
licensee."1 7 In fact, Justice Golden cited authority from several jurisdictions and authors indicating that many states, including most states in the
Rocky Mountain region, still adhere to the common law status classifications and have rejected invitations to abandon or alter them."'
According to Justice Golden, the Wyoming Supreme Court has long
held that the entrant's status is determinative of the landowner's duty of
care." 9 Justice Golden concurred in Clarke's result because of his dissatisfaction with the common law scheme's classification of a social guest as a
licensee. Justice Golden quoted the Indiana Supreme Court's recent
analysis of this issue in Burrell v. Mead. 2 ° The Indiana Supreme Court
stated that classifying a social guest as a licensee is inconsistent with
current social customs. 2' A landowner who invites a social guest onto his
land leads the guest to believe that the land has been prepared for his
safety, so the landowner should be required to exercise reasonable care to
ensure the safety of his social guests. 2 Applying the Indiana Supreme
Court's reasoning to the present case, Justice Golden believed that
Beckwith owed his expressly invited guests a duty of reasonable care.,,
ANALYSIS

The Wyoming Supreme Court correctly decided to abolish the portion of the common law classification scheme distinguishing licensees
from invitees, but the reasons given by the court for doing so are not
completely persuasive. This decision significantly affects Wyoming landowners and occupiers by increasing their potential exposure to liability.
The court's decision in Clarke also presents a potential problem in that it
requires landowners to exercise a greater degree of care for recreational
users than is mandated by statute.' 24

117. Id. at n.l.
118. See, e.g., Moore v. Tucson Electric Power Co., 761 P.2d 1091 (Ariz. 1988); Tjas v.
Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979); Springer v. Pearson, 531 P.2d 567 (Idaho 1975). See also PAGE,
supra note 18, § 6.7, at 139-40.
119. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 297 (Golden, J., specially concurring).
120. 569 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 1991).
121. Id. at 643.
122. Id.
123. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 297.
124. See infra notes 163-174 and accompanying text.
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The Court's Reasons for Abolishing the Distinction

The Wyoming Supreme Court properly abolished the distinction between licensees, but the court's justification for doing so is suspect. As
Justice Golden correctly noted,'2 the trend of abolishing the common law

status classifications ended in the late 1970's, several years prior to the
Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Yalowizer.126 The current trend, if
any trend exists, is to retain the common law status classifications."' In

the last five years, six different states' 28 have either specifically refused to
abandon the common law classification scheme or have attempted to
override judicial abrogation of the common law status classifications and
reinstate the tripartite scheme.' 29

Several factors may underlie the apparent reluctance of many state
courts to abandon the common law scheme. Prosser states that this reluctance may be due to:
[A] more fundamental dissatisfaction with certain developments in
accident law that accelerated during the 1960's-the reduction of
whole systems of legal principles to a single, perhaps simplistic,
standard of reasonable care, the sometimes blind subordination of

other legitimate social objectives to the goals of accident prevention and compensation, and the commensurate shifting of the
decisional balance of power to the jury from the judge. 30

125. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 297 n.l.
126. 629 P.2d 465 (Wyo. 1981). See also PAGE, supra note 18, § 6.7, at 139-40.
127. See Gulbis, supra note 19, 22 A.L.R. 4th 294 § 2.
128. Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Ohio.
129. Lohrenz v. Lane, 787 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Okla. 1990); Baldwin by Baldwin v. Mosley, 748
S.W.2d 146, 148 (Ark. 1988); Kirschner v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 743 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Ky.
1988); Moore v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 761 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Ariz. App. 1988); Preston v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 550 N.E.2d 191, 194 (Ohio App. 1988).
The Colorado legislature attempted to reinstate the common law classification scheme in
1986. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-115 (1986). The Colorado Supreme Court struck down the 1986
law as violative of the Equal Protection clauses of both the United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution. Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856 (Colo. 1989). The Colorado Supreme Court interpreted the 1986 statute as affording "a higher degree of protection to licensees than to invitees." Id.
at 862. The court stated that the legislature's attempt to resurrect the common law classification
scheme was a legitimate and permissible goal, but the law as written was not rationally related to this
goal. Id. A legislative attempt to restore the common law classification scheme would apparently be
permissible if the statute were appropriately written.
130. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 62, at 433-34. See also James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreatfrom the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976). Professor
Henderson criticizes the abolition of the common law framework because he believes it may prevent
courts from screening "potentially unmanageable" and open-ended questions of duty. Juries, lacking
guidance from formal rules, will instead rely on intuition and a desire to compensate an injured party

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1994

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 29 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 10
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXIX

Other justifications include a fear of"upending established common
law precedent by "needlessly inject[ing] uncertainty into ... legal relations"'' and a fear that landowners might "be subjected to unlimited
liability."' 32 Courts refusing to abandon the common law categories prefer
"slow, piecemeal development" to a new and sweeping change.'
These
courts view the common law status classifications and exceptions as the
result of years of judicial analysis and toil, and this judicial effort should
not be abandoned to the discretion of an unguided jury.'34
Contrary to the Wyoming Supreme Court's claim in Clarke, there
has not been "considerable development of the law in this field"' 35 since
its decision in Yalowizer. Nor was its decision foreshadowed by its 1989
statement in Allen v. Slim Pickens Enterprises that "[tjhe key to the cre'
The
ation of a duty to the invitees on the premises is foreseeability."' 36
court's statement specifically mentioned invitees, and therefore seems
applicable only to entrants classified as invitees.' 37 As mentioned previously, the court stated as recently 38as 1992 that Wyoming adhered to the
common law status classifications.1
In short, the abolition of the distinction between licensees and
invitees is a major decision, yet the reasons stated by the court to justify
this change are disingenuous. Clarke may be a result of a change in the
court's thinking, a belief that Yalowizer was misguided, or merely a
change in the make-up of the court.' 39 The court could have been more
when determining the duties owed by landowners and occupiers. Id. at 511-12,

But see Carl S.

Hawkins, Premises Liability After Repudiation of the Status Categories:Allocation of Judge and Jury

Functions, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 15 (1981). Professor Hawkins' empirical research refutes
Henderson's claims. Hawkins found that the jury control devices available to a judge in traditional
negligence law, such as calculus of risk, adequately prevented "unfettered jury discretion" in premises
liability cases. Id. at 61.
131. Adams v. Fred's Dollar Store of Batesville, 497 So.2d 1097, 1102 (Miss. 1986).
132. Younce v. Ferguson, 724 P.2d 991, 995 (Wash. 1986).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 296. The majority cited four cases demonstrating "considerable development" but two of these four cases were decided prior to Yalowizer. Id. See Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A,2d 846 (Me. 1979); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977). The "development" illustrated by the other two cases is countered by the opinions of scholars who state that the

movement to abolish the common law categories came to a "screeching halt" in 1979. PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra note 12, § 62, at 433. See also PAGE, supra note 18, § 6.7, at 139-40.
136. Allen, 777 P.2d at 82.
137. See Clarke, 858 P.2d at 297 (Golden, I., specially concurring). Justice Golden correctly
stated that the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Allen "offered no promise to abolitionists that
this court was poised to repudiate decades of Wyoming jurisprudence following the common law

classifications." Id.
138.

Thunder Hawk by and through Jensen v. Union Pacific R. Co., 844 P.2d 1045, 1048

(Wyo. 1992).
139.

Yalowizer was decided by Chief Justice Rose and Justices Raper, Thomas, Rooney, and
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forthright about its reasons for making the change. The integrity of the
judicial system rests in part on the doctrine of stare decisis, a doctrine
which is "important in an organized society."'" While precedent should
not be adhered to blindly, major changes in the law should be legitimately
justified and explained. To do otherwise reduces the predictability of our
legal system and undermines public confidence in the judiciary.
Evaluation of the Change
Despite its questionable reasoning, the Wyoming Supreme Court was
correct in deciding to abolish the distinction between licensees and
invitees and to require landowners to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances. Its refusal to adopt Rowland's uniform standard of care' 4'
and to continue to treat trespassers separately is also appropriate.
Several factors support the court's decision to abolish a portion of
the common law scheme. Human health and safety outweigh a possessor's
unrestricted right to make use of his property. 4 ' The "circumstances of
modern life" do not easily fit into a rigid classification scheme.' 43 A
person in today's society does not ordinarily focus on his status classification before entering another's property. Landowners probably do not
predicate their actions on whether an entrant's presence confers an economic benefit.
In addition, the common law scheme is riddled with exceptions
which only increase the complexity and confusion already present when a
jury determines a landowner's liability.'" Categorizing a social guest,
even if expressly invited, as a licensee who is not entitled to a duty of
reasonable care confuses juries,'45 judges, and lawyers. "6
Classifying a social guest as a licensee "simply does not comport
with modern social practices."' 4 7 An invited guest should not have to

Brown, none of whom dissented. Of these five, only Justice Thomas is still on the court. Justice
Thomas joined the majority opinion in Clarke, but did not write separately to explain why he changed

his position on landowner duties since Yalowizer. The other four justices on the Clarke court were
Chief Justice Macy and Justices Cardine, Golden, and Taylor.
140. Adkins v. Sky Blue, Inc., 701 P.2d 549, 551 (Wyo. 1985).
141. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
142. O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 749 (N.D. 1977).
143. Id.

144.

O'Leary, 251 N.W.2d at 749. The United States Supreme Court described the common

law scheme and its exceptions as a "semantic morass" and refused to import the classifications into
admiralty law. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631 (1959).
145. O'Leary, 251 N.W.2d at 749.
146. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 60, at 414.
147. Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 643 (Ind. 1991).
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protect himself against unreasonable dangers on the host's property. A
host should have to do more than refrain from inflicting willful and wanton injury on his social guests because an invitation leads a social guest to
expect that the premises have been reasonably prepared for his safety. 4 8
For example the possessor should be required to exercise reasonable care
in the maintenance of his stairs to protect his social guests. If a step is
missing or the banister is loose, the possessor should be required to repair
the problems or at least exercise reasonable care to warn of the potential
dangers. The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision extends beyond social
guests to all those previously classified as licensees. Justice Golden's
concurring opinion indicated his apparent reluctance to afford bare licensees the same level of protection afforded social guests.' 49 However to
elevate social guests to the invitee category and otherwise retain the common law scheme would only increase its inherent complexity. The common law scheme is full of complex and confusing exceptions, 5 ' and this
would only add one more to the list.''
Complete abolition of the distinction between licensees and invitees
is appropriate because one who enters under some pretense of permission
should be entitled to a duty of reasonable care. The foresceability of the
licensee's presence and the burden of alleviating the risk of harm should
determine liability."5 2 A salesperson, mail carrier, or meter reader is not
an expressly invited social guest, yet his presence may be foreseeable.
Mail carriers deliver mail to most homes six days a week. Everyone who
receives this service knows that mail carriers will probably enter their
property once a day. Likewise everyone knows that meter readers check
meters approximately once a month, and that a door-to-door salesman
may stop by on any given day. The possessor should exercise reasonable
care to ensure their safety. This does not mean that a possessor must take
every imaginable precaution, but rather that he act reasonably to maintain
his property in a safe manner and warn entrants of potentially dangerous
hidden conditions or activities in light of the foreseeability of the entrant's
presence and the surrounding circumstances.

148. Id.
149. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 296 (Golden, J., specially concurring).
150. Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639, 644 (Minn. 1972). The Minnesota Supreme Court in
1972 stated "Today, there are so many exceptions that it is nearly impossible to record all of them."
Id.
151. Social guests would be categorized as invitees although they neither confer an economic

benefit on their host nor are they a member of the public entering the land for a purpose for which
the land is held open to the public. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1981). See supra
notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
152. OLeary, 251 N.W.2d at 752.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision to continue separate treatment of trespassers is also justified. While Rowland's uniform standard of
"reasonable care under the circumstances"" 3 has some appeal and may arguably be simpler, there is an inherent difference between those who
enter with permission and those who do not.'54 A trespasser enters the
land of another without permission. The burden of any resulting consequences should be borne by the trespasser, not the landowner who is
unaware of the trespasser's presence. Allowing a trespasser to recover for
the harm he suffered while engaged in a wrongful act likely strikes most
people as unjust and runs counter to society's general expectations. The
exceptions developed to protect the trespasser within the common law
scheme' 55 adequately safeguard the trespasser's interests and protect the
trespasser against traps and other unreasonable risks.156
Impact of Clarke on Wyoming Landowners and Occupiers

The Wyoming Supreme Court's holding in Clarke dramatically
increases a landowner's exposure to potential liability. All persons previously classified as licensees, whether a social guest or bare licensee, are
entitled to reasonable care under the circumstances." 7 Judicial expansion
of potential liability could be considered an intrusion on the province of
the legislature.' 58 However the judiciary is an appropriate place to turn for
relief from outmoded and outdated common law principles.'59
Many landowners may need to increase their insurance coverage to
protect against potentially large damage awards as a result of the court's
decision in Clarke. The impact on society at large may not be readily
apparent because the general public may favor spreading the loss across
society via insurance companies instead of forcing the entrant to bear this
153.
154.

See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
O'Leary, 251 N.W.2d at 751 n.6.

155. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
156. O'Leary, 251 N.W.2d at 751 n.6.
157. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 296. Factors to be considered when deciding whether a landowner
acted reasonably include "the likelihood of injury to another, the seriousness of the injury, and the
burden of avoiding the risk." Id. (citing O'Leary, 251 N.W.2d at 751).

158. This is the reason given by several courts which refuse to impose liability on homeowners
for the actions of intoxicated guests to whom the homeowners served alcohol. See, e.g., Cole v. City
of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982). These cases also impact theduties of a landowner. The reasoning could be analogized to theinstant case. Landowners could conceivably argue
that a change of this magnitude should only be made by a politically accountable legislature which has
the ability and opportunity to conduct hearings and gather evidence so it can consider all the possible
ramifications of such a change.
159. The common law is a product of judicial decisions, therefore the judiciary is an appropriate
place to turn for relief. The judiciary may also be more responsive to the plight of a single individual
than the legislature.
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burden."o However, large damage awards paid by insurance companies
6
usually result in higher insurance premiums to offset this cost.' ' All
homeowners will feel the pinch which results from the negligent actions
of the few.
In addition, landowners like Mr. Beckwith might want to consider
all the possible ramifications of hosting an annual Christmas party. Increasing a landowner's duty of care does not mean that people will cease
having parties or hosting social gatherings, but landowners may invite
fewer people over and expend greater amounts to insure the safety of
their guests.
Clarke does not impact social guests alone. Bare licensees such as
meter readers, delivery-persons, and door-to-door salespersons, are now
entitled to reasonable care.'62 Under Yalowizer, a landowner needed only
to refrain from inflicting willful or wanton harm on these people. Now
the landowner must do more to ensure their safety. A bare licensee's
presence on the land probably is foreseeable, and an injured party is more
likely to recover for harm suffered on another's land after Clarke. The
landowner's actions may be scrutinized by a jury who may be sympathetic
to an injured party.
A potentially troubling result of Clarke is that the Wyoming Supreme Court's holding apparently conflicts with the Wyoming statutes
governing the liability of landowners who allow others to engage in recreational activities on their land.' 63 Clarke requires such landowners to
exercise a higher degree of care than the legislature requires. The Wyoming statutes limit a landowner's liability to those who enter his land for
a recreational purpose"6 and effectively codify the common law classifica-

160. O'Leary, 251 N.W.2d at 749.
161. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1235 (N.J. 1984) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). In Kelly,
the New Jersey Supreme Court imposed liability on social hosts who negligently provided alcohol to a
guest. Id. at 1224. This liability was subsequently limited by the New Jersey legislature:

No social host shall be held liable to a person who has attained the legal age to purchase
and consume alcoholic beverages for damages suffered as a result of the social host's negligent provision of alcoholic beverages to that person.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.7 (Supp. 1993).

162. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 296. The court stated that while trespassers will still receive separate
treatment, "reasonable care under the circumstances" will apply to all others. Id.
163. WYO. STAT. §§ 34-19-101 to 34-19-106 (1990).
164.

WYO. STAT. § 34-19-101(a)(iii) (1990) states:

'Recreational purpose' includes but is not limited to, any one (1) or more of the following:
hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature

study, water skiing, winter sports and viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic or scientific sites.
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tion scheme with respect to persons engaging in recreational activities on
another's land.
According to the statutes, a landowner is liable only for "willful or
malicious failure" to warn or protect recreational users from "a dangerous
condition, use, structure, or activity"' 65 unless the landowner charges
recreational users a fee for their use of his land. 6 In other words, Wyoming statutes require only that the landowner refrain from inflicting willful and wanton harm on recreational users unless such users confer an
economic benefit on the landowner, in which case the common law
scheme would classify the recreational users as invitees.67
The statutes governing landowner liability to recreational users
specifically state that, except as provided in § 34-19-105, the fact that the
landowner:
[E]ither directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge
any person to use the land for recreational purposes

. . .

does not

thereby:
(i) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any
purpose;
(ii) Confer upon the person using the land the legal status of
an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed;
(iii) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any
injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of
the person using the land.' 68
Nor does the landowner have a duty of care to keep the premises safe for
entry or warn of any dangerous conditions on the land.' 69

There is a tension between these statutes and Clarke, which requires
landowners to exercise reasonable care to protect and warn all entrants
who are not trespassers. 7 ° The court carved no exceptions for recreational
users. The statutes state that a landowner who invites others onto his land
to hunt, fish, or hike, for example, owes the entrants no duty of care."'
However Clarke states that a landowner owes such expressly invited

165. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-105(a)(i) (1990).
166. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-105(a)(i.) (1990).
167.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1981).

168. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-103
169. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-102
170. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 296.
171. A landowner has no duty
trants. WYo. STAT. §§ 34-19-102 to

(1990).
(1990).
except to refrain from willfully or maliciously injuring the en105(a)(i) (1990).
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guests a duty of reasonable care.' Likewise the statutes provide that a
person who enters another's land for recreational purposes with permission, but without invitation, does not become an invitee or licensee entitled to reasonable care.' In contrast, those who enter with permission are
and are therefore entitled to reasonable care according to
not trespassers,
74
Clarke.'
The court's broad language appears to conflict with the Wyoming
statutes governing landowner liability to recreational users. Neither party
briefed this issue on appeal, so it is unlikely that the court even considered this particular impact of its decision.' 7 Future cases will determine
whether the court adheres to the broad change announced in Clarke or
carves out exceptions for landowners who allow others to engage in recreational activities on their land.
Retrospective v. ProspectiveApplication
The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision to apply its holding prospectively except as to the parties involved'76 comports with most other
jurisdictions which have abolished the common law distinction between
invitees and licensees.' 77 Such a decision is unfair to the individual landowner who is a party to the case, but is ultimately necessary.
Retrospective application to the parties prejudices the landowner
because his past actions are judged according to a standard that did not
exist at the time. Mr. Beckwith is exposed to liability which he had no
reason to anticipate. Even if he was a "prudent Wyoming landowner...
advised of judicial trends" he would not have anticipated the expansion of
exposure to liability embodied in Clarke. 7 8 Mr. Beckwith had no reason
to purchase additional insurance or take other steps to protect himself
from such liability.

172. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 296.
173. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-103(a)(ii) (1990).
174. Clarke, 858 P.2d at 296.
175. The Yalowizer court specifically recognized the existence of statutes governing landowner
liability to recreational users. Yalowizer, 629 P.2d at 469. In overruling Yalowizer, the Clarke court
could have acknowledged the existence of these statutes. Although discussion of these statutes in

Clarke might have been considered dicta because they were not directly pertinent to the case, the
Clarke court could have avoided the apparent conflict it created by discussing the relationship between

the statutes governing landowner liability to recreational users and its holding in Clarke.
176.
177.

Clarke, 858 P.2d at 296.
See, e.g., O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 751 (N.D. 1977); Peterson v. Balach,

199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Minn. 1972).
178.

Clarke, 858 P.2d at 297 (Golden, J., specially concurring). See supra note 137.
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As unfair as such application may be to a landowner like Mr.
Beckwith, it is necessary to provide injured parties with a suitable incentive to argue for reasonable changes in the law. Potential plaintiffs will
probably be unwilling to endure the expense and hassle of litigating a
claim and successfully changing the law only to be denied compensation.
The legal system should not be so rigid that outmoded and outdated principles forever dictate landowner duties.
Overall, it is probably better to sacrifice the interests of one landowner for the good of society in general. A change which benefits many
and makes sense is preferable to blind adherence to ancient rules.
CONCLUSION

Although the reasons stated are questionable, the Wyoming Supreme
Court's decision to abolish the common law distinction between licensees
and invitees, yet continue to treat trespassers separately, was appropriate
and overdue. The common law scheme and its numerous exceptions is
complex and often unfair.
Persons who enter another's land with permission, whether express
or implied, are entitled to a reasonable amount of care. Those who enter
without permission, however, should not benefit from their wrongful act.
Wyoming landowners and occupiers should be aware that they now
owe entrants on their land a higher degree of care, and that their potential
exposure to liability as landowners and occupiers has greatly increased.
Increased homeowner's insurance and additional precautions may be
necessary to ensure the safety of social guests and bare licensees and
reduce a landowner's exposure to potential liability.
Wyoming landowners who invite or allow others to use their land
for recreational purposes should be aware that the degree of care they
owe recreational users may be markedly increased from that dictated by
the Wyoming statutes. Such landowners may need to taker greater precautions to protect recreational users and may want to restrict such use of
their land until either the Wyoming Supreme Court or the legislature
addresses the tension between Clarke and the statutes governing
landowner liability to recreational users.
MATTHEW F. MCLEAN
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